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War for Profit: Macroculture, Corsairs and 
partnership companies 
 
Abstract 
 
In the present paper we propose that in states with relatively weak central 
authorities, decision makers had to develop market oriented organisation solutions to 
successfully face a grave external threat, and these solutions proved to be efficient. 
Using an interdisciplinary approach that combines institutional theory, history 
and strategy, we analyse the concept of macroculture and then a case study, the use of 
corsairs (privateers) by England and the United Provinces (Dutch Republic) in the late 
16th and early 17th centuries. We also propose that the development of partnership 
companies went hand in hand for commercial and military purposes. 
Lastly, we suggest that a market led decentralised type of war as practiced by 
English and Dutch privateers proved to be economically efficient and superior to the 
centrally planed war operations of the Spanish empire. 
 
Key words: Path dependence and change, institutions, partnership companies, 
corsairs, 16th-17th century England and United Provinces (Dutch Republic). 
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Introduction 
In the present paper we first outline an extended model of path-dependence and 
institutional change that analyses the emergence of new institutions in particular 
historical circumstances, and the emergence of macrocultures. 
When a state faces serious external challenges and there exists no strong central 
authority then market solutions are more likely to emerge in order to face the 
challenge successfully. In the next section we analyse such particular historical 
contexts, the threat posed to English and Dutch independence during the late 16th 
century by Spain. We trace the emergence of a market solution in the form of 
partnership companies to finance the English and Dutch corsairs’ attacks on Spanish 
commerce, which proved to be a very efficient way of battling a stronger enemy by 
concentrating on his vulnerable point. 
 
A model of path dependence and change 
Since David1 and Arthur2 the issue of path dependence has raised considerable 
interest. A more recent area of research is the issue of the causes that may break path-
dependence and lead an economy towards a new, more efficient (in the sense of 
welfare and growth-promoting) path. 
                                                
1  David A. Paul, “Clio and the economics of Qwerty”, American Economic Review 75, 2 (1985):332-337; 
David A. Paul, “Why are Institutions the carriers of history? Path dependence and the evolution of 
conventions, organisations and institutions”, Structural Change and Economic Dynamics 5, 2 
(1994):205-220. 
2 Arthur W. Brian, “Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns and Lock-in by Historical Events”, 
Economic Journal, 394 (1989):116-131. 
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In previous studies has been presented a general model of path dependence and 
change3 and a further development taking into account bounded rationality as a cause 
that explains path dependence4.  
The main points of the model can be summarised as: The successful adaptation 
of a country to a serious external shock brings about a break of path-dependence and 
introduces a new, more efficient path. The going over to the new path is faster than in 
cases of no external threat, where a change is possible (but not necessary) but more 
gradual and lengthy in time. Along the new path, new institutions and organisations 
are developed, which represent substantial new investments both in knowledge and 
financial means. These entail during a first period substantial new costs for the 
decision makers, linked to increased gains in welfare. During subsequent periods, 
these costs represent sunk costs (since they have already been undertaken during the 
first period), and these, together with the perception by the decision makers of higher 
welfare along the new path prevent the economy in reverting to the old path, bringing 
about thus a new path-dependence along the new path. 
In figure 1 the path dependence and change of macrocultures is shown: 
 
 
 
 
                                                
3 Kyriazis Nicholas, “Seapower and socio-economic change”, Theory and Society 35(2006):71-108; 
Halkos George and Kyriazis Nicholas, “A Naval Revolution and Institutional Change: The Case of the 
United Provinces” European Journal of Law and Economics 19 (2005): 41-68. 
4 Kyriazis Nicholas, and Metaxas Theodore, “Bounded Rationality and Institutional Change”, 
Evolutionary and Institutional Economics Review 7,1 (2010):1-19;  
The idea of bounded rationality has been advanced by Simon (1982 and 1991) and has been proposed 
by Frier and Kehoe (2007) to explain historical path dependence. Akerlof and Schiller (2009) have 
developed ideas on somewhat parallel lines  
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Figure 1:  Path dependence and change of macrocultures 
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Source: Kyriazis and Metaxas5 
 
‘om’ signifies the ‘old macroculture’, a system of norms, values, customs, 
etc., that characterises the economic, social and political field of a state and 
associated institutions and organisations.   
‘nm’ signifies the emerging new macroculture, where new norms, values, 
customs, etc., are being created, developed and diffused, so that over time a 
break with the old path macroculture is accomplished, and the state follows a 
new path.  
During each period the state follows the new path nm, the probability of 
staying into the new path increases, and the probability of returning to the old 
path decreases, as given by Table 1, because during each subsequent step along 
the new path, the various elements of the new macroculture are being mutually 
reinforced and integrated into a whole. 
Table 1: Decision tree probabilities 
Time period 1 2 … t 
nm pn1 pn2 = (pn2 / pn1) … pnt = (pnt / pnt-1) 
om 1- pn1 1- pn2 … 1- pnt 
 
                                                
5 Kyriazis Nicholas and Metaxas Theodore (2010) idid 
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With  pn1 …. pnt  conditional probabilities depending on the result of the previous 
period. It is clear that over time the probability of going back to the old 
macroculture (1- pnt) converges towards zero.  
In Figure 2, we represent the decision tree, where the different elements of a 
macroculture (eg. religion, warfare, economy, politics etc.), are gradually being 
integrated into a new whole: 
Figure 2: Decision tree and integration of various elements of a macroculture 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     nm 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                     om   
 
time period:        1                                       2                                       3                                4 
 
The cycles represent the various elements of a new macroculture, that emerge in one 
sector at time period 1, and reinforced through diffusion in other sectors at periods 2 
and 3, and have been intergraded into a new mutually supporting macroculture at 
period 4.  
The model can be described by two simple equations:    
1. m = a +om + nm + e gt* t 
 
with m = macroculture 
        om = the old macroculture 
        nm = the new macroculture 
        which predominates over time if gt is positive.  
 
2. gt = f (gt, d) 
 
is the rate of change, depending on the creation of new elements of a macroculture 
and their speed of diffusion (adaptation by other sectors) (d). The new macroculture 
could first have manifested itself in the maritime sector (in warfare and overseas 
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trade). Values, norms, institutions and organisation forms created here (as for example 
joint-stock companies) were then diffused and taken over by other sectors, thus 
bringing about a new macroculture corresponding to a new path.  
At time period 1, the transformation begins in the maritime sector, both for trade 
in England and the UP though the emergence of the first big joint-stock companies, 
the EIC and VOC to capture trade, and especially spices trade, with the East, and war 
against the Spanish – Portuguese empire. Once the functioning of the joint-stock 
companies is deepened and well understood in these fields, creating a particular set of 
values and norms among its participants (merchants share – holders, captains and 
officers of ships and naval stations on the trading routes, like Cape Town and Bataria 
for the Dutch, naval crews and solders of the companies, but also people working in 
the harbours and merchants and employees in ‘industries’ having linkages to the 
companies, like alimentation, sail making, etc), this form of institutional and 
organisational solution is being different into the other sectors of the economy, like 
textiles, ceramics, sawmills etc, in the case of UP6   
The particular values and norms that emerged in the maritime sector were trust 
(both among the cooperating merchants, but also in general among them their officers 
and the crews, who in the case of privateering enterprises had a share in profit and 
thus a common purpose), self confidence and self reliance (achieved through repeated 
successful enterprises) but also a first sence of fairness and equality, even strong 
religious beliefs (perhaps a protestant ethic according to Weber)7. This sence was 
essential for attracting and retaining crews for the privateering enterprises. Were it not 
the case, then crews would increasingly avoid serving and thus privateering 
                                                
6 See for details, Kyriazis (2006) idid, Halkos and Kyriazis (2005) and de Vires and van der Woude 
(1997) 
7 Weber Max. Economy and Society, 1899. English edition by G. Roth and C. Wittich, Berkeley, UP 
1978 
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enterprises but also long-term trading would be reduced. Thus, these new norms and 
values especially trust, reduced transaction costs, and in this way helped also promote 
economic development. 
Such a set of norms and values promote also a community of interests. People in 
maritime states, throughout history, beginning from Ancient Athens, seem to have 
understood that their direct or indirect participation in this effort brought advantages 
(although of course in different degrees) to everyone involved, and thus they were 
willing to support this effort. 
We now develop the model in order to analyse the emergence of two 
newcomers in the contest for world trade and political dominance, England and the 
United Provinces (Dutch Republic). We propose that in the particular context of the 
late 16th century – beginning of the 17th, the relative weakness of the central authority 
in the two states proved to be an advantage, because it forced them to find market 
solutions to fill the gap of the missing strong central authority.  
In states with strong central power (like imperial Spain, or the Indian Mughal, 
the Chinese Ming, or the Ottoman empire) the central power decides, coordinates and 
retains most of the profits or rents (in the form of taxes, custom duties etc.). In Spain 
for example, the state itself organised most expeditions to the New World (like 
Columbus expedition, to whom crews and ships were provided by Queen Isabella and 
King Ferdinand) and exploited the new lands discovered. The same happened half a 
century earlier for Portugal, where Prince Henri the Navigator organised the voyages 
of exploration and discoveries on behalf of the state8. This is of course not to deny 
that commercial interests existed both in Spain and Portugal, but they were 
subordinated to the central authority. 
                                                
8 Vergé-Franceschi M. Henri le Navigateur. Editions du Félin, 1998. 
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Even stronger was the imposition of the central authority in the form of laws, 
practices, taxes etc. in the three Asian empires, to the long-term detriment of their 
development. The Mughal emperors for example imposed a system of local 
governors, chosen and appointed by them, who governed the region given to them for 
a limited period of years (usually no longer than three) and were then shifted to 
another region. At the time of their death, their fortunes did not go to their heirs, but 
to the emperor himself. This system was designed to prevent the local governors to 
form a permanent power basis in a region, and thus revolt and challenge central 
authority. But the long-term effect was to lead to high consumption and almost no 
investment in the regions, since the governors, staying only for short periods and not 
being allowed to pass the fruits of their investment to their heirs, did not have 
incentives to invest. 
In agriculture, in general non-contiguous pieces of land, called jagirs, were 
granted for short periods, usually for only about three years, again in order to prevent 
nobles establishing a power base in a particular region. Obviously again, the short 
tenures were an incentive for the holders to squeeze as much as possible out of their 
holdings, without consideration of the long-term effects of such policies and 
discouraged any investment in improvements. Jagirs were not inherited. As 
Goldsmith9 remarks “A system less likely to lead to an increase in agricultural 
productivity would be difficult to devise”. The emperor had in addition a substantial 
income from the escheat of all estates left by nobles or by wealthy commoners, 
traders etc., as he chose. 
                                                
9 Goldsmith W. Raymond, Pre-modern Financial Systems, Cambridge UP, (Cambridge, 1987), pp.118 
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In a situation with no established protection of property rights, (as was the case 
in the three Asian empires) other decision makers, like local traders, operated under a 
high risk and uncertainty situation that was also not conductive to investment10. 
This situation was understood and deplored already in 1580 by an Ottoman 
cartographer, who wrote: “It is strange and sad that a group of infidels have achieved 
such strength that they can travel in West and East… while the Ottoman empire, 
which lies at half the distance (compared to them) to India, has not undertaken the 
least effort to conquer India…” 11. 
In states were a strong central authority did not exist for historical reasons and 
commercial interests were much stronger, or even predominated, they had to find new 
solutions to fill the gap and face a strong external challenge. The solution for the 
organisation and financing of overseas expeditions, either to capture trade, in 
particular the very lucrative spices one, or for military reasons, was to develop and 
adapt new organisation forms, in particular, the joint-stock company. In a recent 
paper12 has been analysed the development of the joint-stock company in relation to 
the spices trade and their culmination to the two first prototype companies in their 
respective stock exchanges, the English and the Dutch East India companies (the EIC 
of 1600 and the VOC of 1602). The present paper analyses the development of market 
organisation forms, in the form of partnership companies, this time for military 
purposes. 
But first, let us analyse briefly our statement that 16th century England and the 
United Provinces lacked strong central authorities. By the end of the 15th century, 
                                                
10 For a more detailed analysis of this point and references, see Kennedy (1988, p. 4-14) and Kyriazis 
(2006), and for Mughal India, Spear (1965). 
11 Growley Roger, Empires of the Sea. Faber and Faber (eds) (Paris, 2008). 
 
12 Kyriazis Nicholas, and Metaxas Theodore (2010) ibid 
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England had lost the Hundred Years War against France, and had gone through the 
Civil War of the Roses that culminated in the establishment of a new dynasty, the 
Tudors after the victory of Henry VII at Bosworth in 1485. Henry VII and his heirs, 
Henry VIII, and his daughters Mary and Elisabeth, were thus a new dynasty and had 
to take into account the interests of the survivors of the old nobility, but also of 
commercial interests of cities, new “low” nobility of the country etc. They had to do 
so even more due to threats to their dynastic claims by other contestants (like queen 
Mary of Scotland) and religious cleavages. Also, England had a long tradition of 
insurrection etc. that limited central power, most notably the insurrection of the nobles 
against King John that forced him to grant the Magna Carta in 1215 which can be 
seen as the first constitution of a modern European state (if are accept that some 
ancient states like Athens and Rome had some kind of constitution, called “politeia”). 
Another indication of the relative weakness of the central state in England, is 
the fact that according to contemporary claims13 England was the least heavily 
imposed and least indebted country in Europe, where according to one estimate14 total 
revenue of the public sector reached less than 5% of GDP. The queen had two 
important sources of revenue within her power, crown lands and customs, while she 
depended on Parliament for the “tenth” and “fifteenth” assessed every three years on 
laity and clergy and “subsidies”, granted under extraordinary conditions, mainly war. 
Even more, no strong central authority existed in the United Provinces (Dutch 
Republic), which, up to 1568 were geographically part of the Spanish Netherlands and 
had revolted against them from a mix of political, national, commercial and religious 
causes. Although the UP were formally recognized as an independent nation only at 
                                                
13 Palliser M. David, The Era of Elizabeth. Longmans Publishers, (London, 1983), pp.12 
14 Goldsmith W. Raymond. 1987, ibid,  pp.19 
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the treaties of Westphalia and Muenster of 1648, the majority of the land was already 
independent of Spanish rule by the end of the 16th century.  
The Dutch Republic was formed by seven United Provinces, in which again 58 
cities predominated, with Amsterdam being the most important one15. The main 
centralised coordinating body was the States General with representatives of the seven 
provinces, where each province had one vote and where unanimity was required for 
taking a decision binding on each of them. 
There was also the office of the stadholder, more or less a head of government, 
of each province, who had again a representative and coordinating function, an office 
that was left vacant for substantial periods of time, for example during 1650-1672. 
Another federal institution was the Council of State, a committee of 25 persons 
in which the provinces and the stadholder were represented and which were entrusted 
with military, financial and other business, eg. an executive power. The fleet lay 
under the control of the States General and the admiral general, but the daily direction 
of naval affairs was referred to the five Admiralty Colleges. 
The political system of the UP can be thus called “A democratic head on an 
oligarchic body”, the head being the States General (where each province had a veto 
right due to the unanimity rule) that were elected and the body the 58 semi-
independent cities, which were ruled by the regents (“Regenthen”) commercial 
oligarchy. It was a decentralised system where the provinces and the cities and in 
them the commercial interests, had the stronger position16. 
                                                
15 Davids K. and Hart Marjolein t’ (2012). The navy and the rise of the state: The case of the 
Netherlands c. 1570-1810. In J. Backhaus, N. Kyriazis and N. Rodger, (eds). Navies and State 
Formation. Lang Verlag. 
 
16 For a detailed analysis of the UP political and economic system, see de Vries and van der Woude 
(1997), t’Hart (1996), Kyriazis (2006), Halkos and Kyriazis (2005), Davids and t’ Hart (2012) and the 
additional references provided there. For the Dutch War of Independence, see Parker G. The Dutch 
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Having shown the relatively weaker position of the central authority in England 
and the UP, we turn to the challenge faced by the two states and their market-oriented 
solution. 
The challenge of Spain and the market oriented solution. 
By the second half of the 16th century, the Spanish Habsburg Empire of Phillip 
II extended from its American New World colonies, to the Philippines in Asia, and 
included in Europe Spain itself, Portugal (annexed in 1580), the Low Countries, 
Sardinia, Sicily and the Kingdom of Naples, and Franche-Compté in today’s France. 
Phillip II was an ardent Catholic like his father Charles V, and saw himself as the 
protector of the true faith against heretic Protestants, German, Dutch and English 
alike. Religious, economic and political considerations thus made the Spanish empire 
to fight against both England of Elisabeth I and the Dutch rebels of the United 
Provinces under William and then his son Maurice of Nassau-Orange who 
coordinated the Dutch military effort. Phillip sent armies against the rebels in the 
Netherlands and prepared fleets for invading England, which culminated in the defeat 
of the Spanish Armada in 1588. The Dutch adopted a defensive strategy on land, since 
their own land forces would not be a match in a pitched battle against the Spanish 
tercio regiments, the best infantry of the time. Their defence consisted of fortresses, 
coupled with extensive flooding of land areas by opening dams. England did not have 
a land frontier with any Spanish territory and at the time, like the Dutch, did not yet 
possess any overseas colonies. 
The Dutch, being encircled on land by Spanish territories had only one open 
way to the rest of the world, the sea. They used it to expand commercially, by the end 
                                                                                                                                       
Revolt.  Penguin, 1977.For the “War of the Roses” history, see Kendall P.M. Warwick the Kingmaker. 
Cardinal-Sphere Books 1973, Gillingham J. The Wars of the Roses. Weidenfeld and Nicholson 1981, 
and Gravett C. Bosworth 1485. Osprey Campaign Series, 66, 1999. 
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of the century making their first attempt to capture the spices trade, which they did 
successfully complete during the next century. Parallel to this, they attacked the most 
vulnerable points of the Spanish empire, their maritime commerce with their colonies. 
The English tried also during the same time to actively participate, as newcomers, in 
international maritime trade, at first peacefully, but they encountered the hostility of 
Spain in her own territories, which sometimes expelled British traders by the use of 
force, as at San Juan de Ulua in 156817. The Spanish, wanted to keep a monopoly of 
trade with their colonies, which was one of the causes (the main economic one) for 
hostilities with England. 
Both the English and the Dutch thus went to war against the Spanish trade and 
colonies. For this, they resorted to privateering, using market organisation forms to 
finance their expeditions. 
Queen Elizabeth had started a programme of building dedicated warships 
(sailing galleons) of which she had 34 for the 1588 Armada campaign, 13 of which 
were over 500 tons. This represented 18% of the total English fleet of 197 ships. Of 
them, 18 were build after 1581 and only 3 before 157018. To these must be added 14 
ships build before 156419. This meant that when-undeclared-hostilities started in 
earnest by the beginning of the 1570’s, there were practically no dedicated warships 
to carry the war against the Spanish. 
During the same period, the Dutch revolt had just started and there were none as 
yet dedicated Dutch warships. On the other hand, the distinction between dedicated 
                                                
17 John Hawkins and Francis Drake were at the time merchants who tried to break into the Spanish 
trade monopoly. In September 1568 Hawkins and his five ships was forced to run for shelter into the 
Spanish harbour of San Juan de Ulua. A few days later the Spanish treasure fleet arrived and the 
Spanish assaulted the English ships, and after a six hour battle only two English ships, Hawkins and 
Drake’s escaped (Konstam 2000). 
18 Tincey John, The Armada Campaign. Osprey Elite Series 15, 1988. 
19 Rodger N. A.M. The Safeguard of the Sea. Harper Collins, (London, 1997). 
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warships and armed merchantmen had just started to emerge. Most navies, the 
Spanish-Portuguese included (which also comprised some dedicated warships) made 
up their numbers by impressing merchantmen. Almost all merchantmen were armed, 
and by being up-gunned (with the addition of more guns) and up- crewed (with the 
addition of more crew members to serve the guns and in the Spanish navy with 
soldiers to serve as boarders) the merchantmen became relatively efficient men of 
war20. 
Thus, the English and Dutch could solve relatively easily the first part of the 
challenge, the availability of ships. The solution to the second part was less obvious: 
Who and how would organise and finance the war operations against the Spanish? 
In the UP, were the revolt had just started, these were as yet not even a 
rudimentary central federal authority to do it. England, as stated above, had some 
royal ships, but retained them for home defence, as a fleet in being. Even more 
serious, the English Crown did not have adequate finances for overseas expeditions. 
Queen Mary, Elizabeth’s sister and predecessor inherited from her father, Henry VIII 
an empty treasury and a heavy foreign debt (owed to foreign bankers). She managed 
her affairs with great prudence, a pattern followed by Elizabeth after she became 
Queen in 1558. During 1565-1574 she spent on average just £16.000 per year on her 
Navy (6,5% of total income). But she had spent £ 246.380 on the fruitless Havre 
expedition (or about a year’s total revenue) and she also had a considerable foreign 
debt21. Elizabeth out of prudence (learning of the risks and costs of overseas 
                                                
20 The Dutch were so successful against the Spanish with this practice that they discovered quite late 
and to their detriment the necessity of dedicated warships. This happened after their defeat during the 
fist Anglo-Dutch war of 1652-1654 by the English dedicated warships, which forced them to build their 
own (Rodger N. The Command of the Ocean. Penguin-Allen-Lane, 2004; Davids and t’Hart forthcoming 
ibid, Tincey 1988 ibid). 
21 Rodger N. A.M (1997) ibid 
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expeditions like Havre’s) and necessity could not finance herself out of state revenues 
costly over-seas expeditions against Spanish commerce and New World colonies. 
In both the English and the Dutch case, market solutions were found: the use of 
privateers-corsairs for a war for private first and public as a second, profit. 
 
The emergence of new macrocultures 
These market solutions shaped the emergence of a new macroculture. Gradually 
over time, macro cultures develop that differentiate the basic structures of states, both 
political and economic. A macro culture encompasses the common values, norms and 
beliefs shared among members of a society or state. Through these values, norms and 
beliefs, a macro culture guides actions and creates typical behaviour among 
independent entities (actors) so that it coordinates their activities so that complex 
tasks may be completed22.  
We argue that a particular macro culture developed for England and the UP, due 
to specific historical conditions and the absence of a strong central authority that 
helped develop in general market oriented solutions like ‘partenrederijs’  and ‘market 
partnerships’ (some of which developed into joint-stock companies), stock exchanges 
etc. 
Merchants who introduced new forms of organisations, the partnerships, to 
solve the coordination and cooperation problem to be able to participate in long 
distance trade (as for example the furs timber and cereals trade with Muscovy, the 
                                                
22 Jones, Candace., Hesterly William, and Borgatti Stephen, “A General Theory of Network Governance; 
Exchange Conditions and Social Mechanisms”, Academy of Management Review 22,4 (1997):911-945; 
Abrahanson Eric, and Fombrun J. Charles, “Macrocultures: Determinants and Consequences”, 
Academy of Management Review 19(1994)728-755; Abrahanson Eric, and Fombrun J. Charles, 
“Forging the iron cage: Interorganisational networks and the production of macro-culture”, Journal of 
Management Studies 29(1992):175-194; Kyriazis Nicholas, and Metaxas Theodore, “Path Dependence 
and Change and the Emergence of the First Joint-Stock Companies”, Business History 53, 3 
(2011):363-374 
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herring fishing in the Atlantic and above all, the spices trade) developed a particular 
macro culture of values, norms and beliefs.  
Simon23 developed the theory of bounded rationality that states that the mind 
has limitations, for example in its capacity to absorb and use new information. We are 
not ‘totally’ rational in the sense of seeking to maximize utility or any other ‘ideal’. 
What we actually do in real life is to try to reach a solution that satisfies us, even if it 
is not the best possible one. We may even ignore the best possible one that would 
maximize utility. Simon calls this behaviour ‘safisficing’. Satisficing enables us to 
find acceptable solutions with minimal expenditure of time and effort, this reducing 
transaction costs.  
Such behaviour has further consequences: Once we have found solutions to a 
particular problem that are presented as adequate, when facing a new problem, we try 
to use the established and known ‘rules of the thumb’, the known knowledge we 
posses, in order to solve the new problem. This again reduces our effort and time 
consumed, which is important due to our brain’s capacity limitation. Only if we do 
not find an adequate solution using the existing knowledge and if the problem we face 
is serious enough, do we devote effort and time to find new solutions. Once we have 
found some, we have increased our total learning and knowledge.  
Satificing behaviour thus diffuses known solutions and problem – solving rules 
to new problems. But it does so also form the basis of a change from one path to 
another. Once such a move starts, the diffusion of the particular set of values, norms 
and beliefs from one sector to another (sector meaning both from one part of the 
economy to the other, but also from one ‘sphere’ to another, for example from the 
                                                
23 Simon Herbert., Models of Bounded Rationality. vols. 1 and 2, MIT Press, 1982; Simon Herbert, 
“Bounded Rationality and Organisational Learning” Organization Science 2, 1 (1991):125-134. 
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military to the political, or from the economic to the political) strengthens path 
dependence along the new path24. 
We argue further on that this is what happened in England and the UP. Due to 
weak central authorities in both states, a market oriented macroculture developed in 
the beginning for trade, and then, for war. Trust among members who formed 
partnerships for trade, was a basic element for them to form partnerships for war. At 
the same time, trust between ship’s captains (very often one of the merchants, like 
Frobisher, Hawkins and Drake for England) and their crews, developed during their 
merchant enterprises, was paramount also for their privateering enterprises. And, as a 
market incentive, privateering was undertaken under the profit motive, exactly 
paralleling merchant activities.   
In the cases analysed here, a new organisation form had been already 
“discovered”, used and tested for overseas trade, the primitive forms of partnership 
companies. In the UP, they took the form of partenrederijs used for the exploitation 
first of the North-Atlantic fisheries and then being diffused to general trade, and from 
the end of the 16th century, also to the spices trade. Similar developments took part in 
England, with the oldest joint-stock company, the Guinea Adventurers being 
established in 1553 for trade with Western Africa, followed in 1555 by the Muscory 
company for trade with the then Duchy of Moscow. The Dutch and EIC joint-stock 
companies culminated, as an organisation form, in the east India Companies, the 
English EIC of 1600 and the Dutch VOC of 160225. 
                                                
24 Kyriazis and Metaxas (forthcoming) analyse the emergence of such a macroculture in Archaic and 
Classical Greece due to the emergence of the new military formation, the phalanx and the new 
warships, the trieres, and how the values developed into the military field were diffused into the political 
and became a pre-condition for the emergence of democracy.   
25  Kyriazis N. and Metaxas T. (2011) idid; Palliser D.M. (1983) idid 
 19 
 Privateers and corsairs26 were distinguished from outlaw pirates, since they 
were empowered by their governments to wage war against their enemies, but not 
against neutral states and their own ships. They received a “letter of marque” or 
“reprisal” stating this, and thus acted in a general sense on behalf of their government. 
What distinguished them from the official government and state owned ships was the 
organisation and financing of their expeditions and their latitude in pursuing their 
aims. As to the second, individual captains, or leaders of expeditions in cases where 
more than one ship participated (more and more common by the end of the 16th and 
beginning of the 17th century) were totally free to choose the region of their 
operations and the way they would operate, as well as the time they would devote to 
their operations. They waged an individual, decentralised type of war, which as we 
will show later on, proved to be extremely efficient.  
As to the first, they took over the partnership as their organisation form. There 
was a further reason for this, the fact that decision makers in peaceful trade were very 
often the same with those that became privateers, like the Englishmen John Hawkins, 
Martin Frobisher, Francis Drake and many others, who started as traders, became 
successful corsairs and then were knighted for their services as captains in the fight 
against the Spanish Armada invasion attempt of 1588. 
The economic effects of privateering 
a )  T h e  D u t c h  “ S e a  B e g g a r s ” .  
In the early days of the Dutch Revolt warfare was dominated by the actions of a 
bunch of unruly privateers, called “beggars” in contempt by the Spanish, a name 
                                                
26 Privateers and corsairs are synonymous, the first term coming from “private” denoting ownership of 
the ship by the captain or the company (as against English royal ships owned by the state-queen). 
Corsair comes from the French “course” meaning booty. As we show, in some cases piracy and 
privateering was indistinguishable. Corsairs could cross over the “red line of legality” and become 
pirates. 
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which they proudly took over as “Watergeuzen” (Sea Beggars). Indeed the Sea 
Beggars liberated the first Netherlands territory from the Spanish, capturing in a 
surprise attack the port of Brill in 1572. This was followed rapidly by a number of 
other ports, Flushing and Veere (in Zeeland), Enkhuizen (in North Holland) and later 
by major cities like Amsterdam. Thus, the UP acquired the necessary ports for their 
trade expansion, which served also as privateering bases27. 
During the first two decades of the Revolt, the port-cities authorities were 
somewhat reluctant to grant corsairs licences, because some privateers attacked and 
plundered neutral ships, thus endangering the diplomatic efforts of the States General 
that worked for the recognition of Dutch independence by other states. But in 1598 
King Philip of Spain issued an official embargo against the Dutch, forcing the States 
General to react: All goods and possessions of Spain were legitimate prizes of 
privateers. In order to limit “outlaw behaviour” by privateers the States General 
demanded a caution of money of 6.000 guilders, later raised to 20.000, which was 
forfeited in case of misbehaviour of the captain, eg. if he attacked neutral ships28. 
Showing remarkable flexibility and a very early case of investment cross border 
mobility according to the institutional advantages and disadvantages offered by each 
location, many Dutch privateers turned their back on Holland after 1604, when the 
States General raised the bail and made conditions for obtaining privateer licences 
more difficult, some becoming pirates, but more often, the merchants joint- stock 
companies financing (mainly from Zeeland) and contracting French captains (some 
from Dunkirk) like the famous ones Nicholas Jarry and Pierre le Turcq. Amsterdam 
                                                
27 Israel I. Jonathan, The Dutch Republic: Its rise, greatness and fall, 1477-1806. Clarendon Press 
(Oxford, 1995); Parker Geoffrey, The Dutch Revolt.  Penguin, (London, 1977) 
28 Loo, Ivo van. For freedom and fortune: The rise of Dutch privateering in the first half of the Dutch 
Revolt, 1568-1609. In Marco van der Hoeven (eds), Exercise of arms. Warfare in the Netherlands 1568-
1648, Leyden-Brill, (New York, 1998), pp. 173-196.  
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merchants soon followed the example of the Zeeland merchants, financing Durkirk 
privateers. Well-to-do merchants from Middleburg (in Zeeland) engaged in the 
privateering business right up to the end of the 18th century. Another Zeeland port 
Flushing (Vlissingen) grew into one of the most feared privateering ports of the 
time29. 
We have within the various cities of the early UP an early manifestation of 
intercity competition that led in the course of time to some maritime specialisation: 
Amsterdam developed into the most important trading and entrepôt city and thus was 
less interested over time into privateering business. Some Zeeland ports, like Flushing 
and Middleburg, which were economically hit by the downfall of neighbouring 
Antwerp (due to a large part to Dutch sea blockade) specialised into the alternative 
maritime business form of privateering. 
But even Amsterdam invested heavily into privateering in an indirect form, 
through the prototype joint-stock companies, the East India VOC established in 1602 
and the West Indian one. Amsterdam financial interests were predominant in both30. 
The VOC played an important role by undertaking large-scale privateering 
activities against Spanish and Portuguese (Portugal having been incorporated into the 
Spanish empire in 1580) ships and colonies in Asia31. The West Indian Company was 
even more successful in its privateering expeditions, its biggest success coming in 
1628, when a company fleet commanded by Piet Heyn managed to capture one 
Spanish Plata Silver fleet off Matanzas in Cuba. It was the only time in history that an 
entire Spanish treasure fleet was captured. This not only financed the WIC’s 
successful conquests in Brazil, but also destroyed in one blow about a third of the 
                                                
29 Davids K. and M.t’Hart (2012) ibid 
30 Kyriazis N. and Metaxas T. (2011) ibid 
31 Gaastra, F. Simon,  The Dutch East India Company, Walburg Press, (Zupthen,2003). 
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ships employed in Seville’s (Spain’s main port with the New World) Atlantic trade. 
Between 1623 and 1626 the WIC took or destroyed 547 ships worth about 5,5 Mio 
guilders32. This sum was greater than the WIC’s total, own capital. The WIC capital 
was 7 mio guilders, and the value of the silver captured in 1628 was more than 10 mio 
guilders33. 
Within the Dutch-Spanish conflict, the Dutch were also fighting against 
Portuguese, since Portugal had been incorporated since 1580 in the Spanish empire, 
and remained part of it till 1640 (The Portuguese squadron of the Spanish Armada of 
1588 was one of the best and ………of 12 galleons with 387 guns and 3649 crew)34. 
Portuguese ships and colonies suffered substantially from Dutch attacks, both in 
American waters, (outside Brazil) Africa (outside Angola) and Asia. In particular, the 
Dutch thought that these Portuguese colonies were weak links in the Spanish – 
Portuguese empire and, using seapower, they extended their operations ashore, 
attacking Portuguese strongholds. In 1624-5 they took and then lost Bahia, in 1630 
they began the conquest of Permanbaio (NE. Brazil) which has completed by John 
Maurice in 1637, in 1638 they captured Elucina in Guinea (Africa) and started the 
conquest of coastal Ceylon, in 1640 they defeated a Portuguese armada of 
Pernambuco, in 1641 they captured Malacca (in SE. Asia, today’s Malacca Straits), 
the Mercahao and Luanda. They concluded a Ten Year Trace with the Portuguese in 
June 1641. Hostilities resumed nevertheless in 1644-5 with a rebellion against the 
Dutch in NE Brazil, while the Portuguese recaptured Luanda and Benguela in 1648, 
and by 1654 the Portuguese expelled definitely the Dutch from Brazil. On the other 
                                                
32 Cooper J.P. Sea Power, in the New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. IV 1970. In The Decline of Spain 
and the Thirty Years War. Cambridge UP, Chapter 5, pp. 226-238. 
33 Goldsmith W. Raymond. The Financial Development in India, 1860–1977. Oxford University Press, 
(New Delhi, 1983), pp. 214, 305 
34 See Koustan, A. (2001). The Armada Campaign. Osprey Campaign 86 
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hand, the Dutch completed during 1654-1658 the conquest of Coastal Ceylon and 
Malabar from the Portuguese. Peace was signed with the now independed (since 
1640) Portugal, which left the Dutch dominant in Indian Ocean waters and Asia 
(where the Portuguese retained only a few bases like ….in the Indian peninsula and 
Macao off the Chinese coast) and the Portuguese undisputed mates in Brazil35. 
The Dutch – Portuguese conflict was costly for both sides and most of capital of 
the Dutch West India Company was lost in the Brazilian war, which explains in past 
why the WIC was less durable and successful than the VIOC. On the other hand, the 
war was even more costly for Portugal, which although it did regain Brazil, lost most 
of its Asian colonies, and even more important, the lucrative spices trade. Portugal 
was definitely in decline by the 17th century36              
 
b )  T h e  E n g l i s h  S e a  D o g s .  
Already by 1563 Elizabeth granted the first “letters of reprisal”. The corsairs’ 
enterprises linked trade, war and privateering and in some cases like with the Dutch, 
piracy, with the religious feeling of “holy” war of the Protestants against the Catholic 
League of Phillip II linking with patriotism and economic gains. As with the Dutch, 
and more or less for the same reason, the organisation form of joint-stock companies, 
called “syndicate of investors”, were chosen. These syndicates were open for 
participation to merchant-bankers, nobles, the captains and the sailors of the ships, but 
even members of government. In the financing of Drake’s expedition of 1577 
                                                
35 For more details of the Dutch-Portuguese conflict, see Boxer (1965) ‘The Dutch Seaborne Empire’, 
and Boxer (…) ‘The Portuguese Seaborne Empire, both Hutchinson & Co and W.C. Atkinson (1963) ‘A 
history of Spain and Portugal’, Penguin Books. 
36 We owe this clarification to one of the reviewers 
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participated along the usual merchant and banking circles, Sir Francis Walsingham, 
the Secretary of State, and Queen Elizabeth herself 37. 
The gains were distributed according to everyone’s share in the enterprise, with 
the Lords of the Admiralty (eg. the “Ministry of the Navy” of the time) receiving 10% 
of the sales at auctions of the seized enemy property. This can be interpreted in 
modern terms as a kind of sales tax, linked to the fact that the Admiralty granted the 
licences to the privateers38. 
As suggested in Kyriazis-Metaxas39, the first successful expeditions initiated a 
continuous game, along which the enterprises became more elaborate, ambitious and 
bigger. Along each further step of the game, the decision makers gained every kind of 
new knowledge, financial, organisational, operational and technical. 
After the successful repulse of the Spanish Armada in 158840, Elizabeth and the 
Lords of the Admiralty felt that since the danger of invasion was less acute, they 
could use also royal warships in privateering expeditions. So, in some of the 
expeditions of the 1590’s, Elizabeth contributed both funds and “means in kind”, eg. 
royal warships. For the 1596 expedition against Puerto Rico, she contributed 33.266 
pounds and some royal ships to the total of the 26 ships. Commonly, guns from royal 
ships, as well as cords, ropes etc. were used to furnish the “private” privateering ships. 
We can interpret, in modern terms, this organisational development as one of the first 
                                                
37 Bradford Ernle. Drake. Hodder and Stoughton, (London, 1965). 
38 Konstam Agnus, Elizabethan Sea Dogs 1560-1605. Osprey Elite Series 70, (Oxford, 2000); Andrews 
K.R. Elizabethan Privateering. Cambridge UP, (Cambridge, 1964); Rodger N. A.M. The Safeguard of 
the Sea. Harper Collins, 1997; Kyriazis Nicholas, and Zouboulakis Michel, “The Economics of Sea 
Power: Property Rights Arrangements and Institutional Change in Elizabethan England”, Economic and 
Social Sciences Tribune 37 (2003):77-96. 
39 Kyriazis N. and Metaxas T. (2011) ibid 
40 Konstam Agnus. The Armada Campaign. Osprey Campaign 86, (London, 2001). 
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historical cases of Public-Private Partnerships (PPP), which was a case of acquiring 
and deepening new organisational and institutional knowledge. 
Technical knowledge went also hand in hand with organisational one. Since the 
privateering enterprises were driven by market and profitability considerations, we 
should expect that cost and efficiency aspects were given particular attention. When 
“businessmen” undertook the privateering operations under the profit motive, they 
made their ex-ante calculations with this aim, much more so than say Spanish 
“bureaucrats” who were administering and appropriating state funds. This actually 
happened in England. We analyse two technical aspects to illustrate this. 
Till the middle of the 16th century, most guns were made of bronze, which 
offered many advantages compared to iron guns41. But for the English, and for 
privateering in particular, iron guns offered a decisive advantage, that of cost. Iron 
abounded in the country and iron guns cost one tenth of the price of bronze guns. 
During the period under consideration, a period of increasing inflation in Europe and 
in England, the price of cast iron guns actually fell from 10-12 pounds per ton in 
1565-1570 to 8-9 pounds in 160042. As expected, privateering ships, (and royal ships 
as well) were increasingly supplied by iron guns. This again led to a great impetus to 
the iron industry in England. Thus, cost considerations linked with the profitability 
motive of the privateering expeditions led to long lasting economic effects43. 
                                                
41 Iron melts at a much higher level of temperature that bronze, making it thus much more difficult to 
achieve high quality without shortcomings. It weighs about 20% more than bronze and becomes 
corrugated by gun-powder. A bronze gun that received an overdose of powder discharge dilates and 
cracks, but an iron gun under the same circumstances just explodes without further warning. Thus, iron 
guns were more dangerous to their crews (Rodger, 1997). 
42 Davies C.S.L. Supply Services of the English Armed Forces. Ph.D. Thesis Oxford University, 1963. 
43 For an analysis of the economic effects of the iron guns production and the development of the iron 
industry it helped create, see Kyriazis-Zouboulakis (2003) and additional references cited there 
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Privateering ships were, also due to cost considerations, relatively small, 
compared to their prey, the Spanish and Portuguese Atlantic and Asian galleons. 
Drake’s “Golden Hind” for example had a displacement of 120 tons (and was armed 
with 18 iron guns)44 compared to 700 and up to 1.200 tons of the enemies galleons 
and naos45. In order to be able to defeat their enemies in battle, the small English 
privateering ships had to develop a technical advantage: They were better sailing 
ships, but also, they achieved a much higher rate of fire. This again was due to their 
development of a new gun carriage (four short wheels against two big ones as in land 
guns in most Spanish ships) and tackle system, which permitted a faster reloading of 
guns. According to some estimates, the English could fire a shot every two minutes, 
while the Spanish needed usually double that time. The new gun carriage-tackle 
system was first introduced in the “Mary Rose” of 154546 but it was generalised by 
the 1560’s in all privateering ships and parallel to them, in the royal ships. It is clear, 
that the new innovation was efficiency enhancing. 
We now turn to a brief summary of privateers operations and their economic 
effects. Most famous amongst them was Drake’s expedition of 1577 which would 
result in the second, after Magellan’s, circumnavigation of the world47. In the Pacific 
Ocean, off the coast of Peru he captured the Spanish galleon “Nuestra Seňora de la 
Conception” loaded with 26 tons of silver from the silver mines of Potosi. At the 
Molucas islands in the Pacific he added a second ship carrying spice, before returning 
                                                
44 Bradford E. 1965, ibid 
45 The nao was a Portuguese big merchant sailing ship (the word originating probably from the Greek 
“ναυς” meaning ship). Konstam (2001) gives a list of the Spanish-Portuguese Armada ships, many of 
which were armed merchantmen. Among them the naos “Santa Anna” and the “La Regazona” both 
displaced 1200 tons, while among the typical merchantmen supply ships, we find “El Gran Grifon” and 
“San Salvador” of 650 tons and “El Castilo Negro” of 750. 
46 Konstam A., 2001, ibid 
47 Drake started the expedition with 5 sips and 164 men, but finished only with his own “Golden Hind” 
(Bradford 1965 p. 101). 
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to Plymouth in 1580. The value of his plunder was the astronomical sum of 600.000 
pounds, double the annual Crown revenue. His investors had a rate of return of 
4.700%, which makes it probably the best single investment in history. 
During the last two decades of the 16th century, the cargoes of Spanish ships 
seized by privateers were valued at 100-200.000 pounds per year, representing about 
15% of total English imports. During the war period with Spain after 1588, they 
seized over 1.000 ships and organised a total of 150 expeditions against the Spanish 
towns and settlements in the New World, leading to the conquest and plunder of many 
of them, such as Puerto de Caballos in Mexico (plundered 6 times) Porto Bello in 
Panama, even Cadiz in Spain in 1587 and 1596. Their success was such that the prices 
of colonial goods of the Spanish empire were often lower in the London than in the 
Seville market!48  
The importance of privateering for England is illustrated also by the fact that 
coinage during Elizabeth’s reign is given as £ 5,4 mio, out of which £ 4,6 mio silver. 
According to Goldsmith49 “Most apparently came from Spanish America, partly as 
the result of naval privateering operations”. Craig50 estimated the amount of silver 
captured from Spain at £ 1,25 mio, or 27% of total silver circulation.  
When the treaty of Muenster of 1648 brought peace and formal recognition of 
the UP by Spain, Spain managed to retain most of its colonies in America, with the 
lost of only some of them in the Caribbean. But Spain was in decline, and did not 
regain its leading position as the greatest European power. During the period from 
1557 to 1647 there were six consecutive bankruptcies, which brought down with them 
                                                
48 Andrewes R. Kenneth, Trade, Plunder and Settlement: Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the 
British Empire 1480-1630. Cambridge UP, (Cambridge, 1984); Rodger N. A.M. 1997, ibid; Kyriazis N. 
and Zouboulakis M. 2003. ibid 
49 Goldsmith R.W. (1983), pp.180,  ibid 
50 Craig John. The Mint. Cambridge UP, (Cambridge, 1953), pp.127. 
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great financial houses, ruining its financial credibility and destroyed in the long-run 
the development of a stable financial, banking system and stock exchange in Spain51.     
As Rodger52 remarks: “Twenty years of war changed England’s perspective. 
While before the Queen possessed an imposing but almost isolated fleet now naval 
strength had become a national matter. It was clear that England’s future laid in the 
open seas… The English had learned that the sea was more than a defence against a 
hostile world: it had become the means to discover new worlds for gold, fame and 
glory”.53  
 
Conclusion 
Due to the particular historical circumstances pertaining in the second half of 
the 16th century, two relatively poor newcomer states in the international arena, 
England and the UP, both having relatively weaker central authorities than 
contemporary empires (the Spanish, Ottoman, Mughal and Ming) had to find new 
means to face the Spanish challenge. 
They adopted market oriented solutions, to wage war for profit using 
partnership companies as an organisation form to mount privateering expeditions. It 
                                                
51 See Rodger 1997; North 1990; North and Thomas 1973; Kyriazis and Zouboulakis 2003; Trevor and 
Poper 1970; Spooner 1970; Cooper 1970; Kennedy 1988. We have elaborated the above on the 
request of one reviewer. In general, both historians and economists agree on the decline of Spain as a 
result of the war with England and the UP. Rodger (1997) [chapters 18, 20 and 24] describes the results 
for Spain’s commerce and gives a vivid description of the ruin of Spanish shipyards. Older historians 
already had described this, as Trevor Roger (1970, chapter IX, p.263) writing: ‘The war had now proved 
long, meaningless and disastrous’, Cooper (1970, chapter VIII) writing on a change in the balance of 
sea-power and the rise of the Dutch and English naval supremacy, and Spooner (1970, chapter II) 
writing on Spain’s decline and the Northern states rise. Even the title of vol. IV of the New Cambridge 
Modern History is characteristic: ‘The decline of the Spain and the Thirty Years War’, Kennedy (chapter 
II, p.41) writes on the conclusion of the war ‘…they revealed that the age of Holsburg ….in Europe was 
over’   
52 Rodger N. A.M (1997), pp. 296,  ibid 
53 The last phrase has been attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh, a famous corsair, admiral and poet. 
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was a decentralised form of war-making, since privateers followed their own aims and 
tactics, not according to a central plan. They could expect maximization of profits if 
they attacked the enemy’s commerce, both ships and settlements. In due time this 
strategy of commerce raiding proved to be the Achilles heel of the enemy. As we have 
sketched above, the privateering-commerce raiding activity brought wealth and profits 
to England and the UP and ruin to Spain. It was the first time in history that 
privateering was used in such scale and to such effect, (although of course 
privateering and piracy is almost as old as maritime history itself). Thus it comes as 
no surprise that this commerce raiding strategy has been adopted during the following 
years as a strategy of the weaker naval opponent against the stronger one, with 
varying successes, as for example by the French against the Anglo Dutch during the 
War of Spanish succession 1702-1713 and the Napoleonic Wars, and the German 
submarine warfare against the Allies during the two World Wars. 
Economists of course have very often argued about the superiority of market 
regimes as against state planed ones in terms of economic efficiency and growth. 
The main point of our analysis here is that market solutions can prove to be 
superior in war strategy, even though they came about, as in the cases of England and 
the UP, by chance or by trial and error. It seemed that pursuing personal profit, as the 
privateers did, they operated under an “Invisible Hand of the market of war” (to 
paraphrase the well known dictum of Adam Smith) which in the end maximized 
operational efficiency and economic benefits. 
On the other hand, the more centralised Spanish empire had an elaborate policy 
driven by non or mainly non economic motives. Kennedy54, for example gives as the 
main policy aims of the Habsburgs religion ‘protector of Catholic Christendom’ and 
                                                
54 Kennedy Paul. The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers. Unwin-Hyman, (London, 1988), pp. 51. 
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‘reputation’. The relative strength of the central authority in Spain, coupled to 
centrally laid policy aims led to “acts of economic folly”55 and institutional solutions 
that in the long run were growth inhibiting56. Phillip II of Spain for example used his 
considerable wealth to wage war at the same time against the Ottomans in the 
Mediterranean, the revolted Dutch, the English and the German Protestants. His 
resources were not sufficient for all these operations. Further, he neglected one of his 
empires crucial regions, the New World possessions and his lines of communications. 
Were he to operate under more market oriented considerations, his policy priorities 
would have been to strengthen the defences of his New World territories and of his 
sea communications, instead of wasting money fighting the Protestant German 
princes and the Dutch. 
Moreover, the privateering war against Spain fostered a new ‘macroculture’ of 
new norms and values, which were market oriented and not imposed by a central 
authority, like self-confidence, self-reliance trust, a ‘sense of destiny’ and the profit 
motive. This macroculture was the basis for searching and finding new institutional 
solutions to a new formidable challenge, that of Spain’s threat to the independence 
and the economic interests of England and the UP. The answer were market based 
institutions and organisations, like partnerships and joint-stock companies both for 
trade and for war, and later a whole interdependent complex of financial institutions, 
banks, insurance and stock exchanges. We have suggested that due to bounded 
rationality, the new organisations forms that emerged as a solution to enable 
merchants to participate in long distance trade, were taken over when facing the 
                                                
55 Kennedy Paul (1988), pp. 52,  idid 
56 North (1981) and Kennedy (1988) give many examples of bad institutional choices taken by the 
Spanish empire, as for example the taxation of the “mesta” guild (wool producer of Spain) that inhibited 
the enclosure movement in Spain and thus long run efficiency in agriculture. 
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challenge of war, and were successful also here. These organisations for partnerships 
and joint-stock companies were later diffused to all sectors of economic activity. 
Thus the macroculture that emerged first in the maritime sector (for peace and 
war activities) became the basis for a gradual break of  the old path dependence, as 
illustrated in our model, and the development along a new path which was also 
growth- enhancing in the long-run. England and the UP became the richest (in terms 
of GDP per capita) countries in the world during the 17th century57. 
We have also argued that the external challenge of breaking Spanish-Portuguese 
dominance certainly accelerated the movement along the new path for England and 
the UP, and perhaps was even the main reason that this new path emerged.        
We suggest as a further area of research the analysis of other historical cases 
under the criteria proposed here. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
57 De Vries Jan. and van der Woude Ad, The First Modern Economy. Cambridge University Press, 
(Cambridge, 1997). 
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